GR No L-68589-90

Paulino Chang vs Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No L-68589-90  December 29, 1986

Facts:

            Chang was charged against violation of Bouncing Checks Law and for Estafa under Article 315 of the RPC. It was alleged that Chang, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representations as a businessman specializing in the importation of machineries and farm implements assured Reaport of the investments should he so desire, succeeded in inducing Reaport to invest. Chang issued and delivered to Reaport BPI check with the assurance that the same was well-funded, knowing fully well that the same was not. The said check was dishonored when Reaport proceeded to encash the same.

            RTC found Chang guilty and the IAC affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:

            WON Chang was guilty of violation against Bouncing Checks Law

Held:

            There is no question that the check issued by Chang bounced for insufficiency of funds, so that he should be guilty of violation of BP Blg 22. The drawee bank’s statement of accounts respecting that of appellant would indicate that the amount of the account issued with the check had insufficient balance to fund the same.

            The defense that the check was issued as a gambling check for money lost at gambling, hence, illegal and void from the very beginning lacks credence. Chang issues the check in payment of an obligation to return the money he got from Reaport, including profit. It was not by way of guaranteeing Reaport’s investment. It was the inducement that convinced Reaport of a sure return of his money plus the profit promised. The gambling debt theory is characterized with circumstances doubly hard to believe.

            Hence, Chang was found guilty of the violation against Bouncing Checks Law.

GR No 175750-51

Silverina Consigna vs People of the Philippines

GR No 175750-51    April 2, 2014

Facts:

            Consigna, then the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, obtained a loan from Moleta to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipality’s IRA had not yet arrived. As payment, Consigna issued three Land Bank of the Philippines checks signed by Rusillon, then incumbent mayor of the same municipality. In several attempts and on different occasions, Moleta demanded payment from Consigna and Rusillon, but to no avail. When she deposited the same to the bank, the checks were returned for having no sufficient funds. Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that said account indicated in the issued checks was already closed and transferred to DBP and Consigna had been relieved from her position.

            After trial, Sandiganbayan found Consigna guilty, but exonerated Rusillon for not having participated in the acts committed by Consigna. Hence, this petition with the SC.

Issue:

            WON Consigna be held guilty of estafa as penalized under Article 315 of RPC and that of Section 3 (e) of RA No 3019.

Held:

           The Petition must fail.

        SC ruled that it is entrenched in this jurisdiction is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information which specifies the provision of law to have been violated which were mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.

          In another matter, the law explicitly provides that in the prosecution for estafa under Article 315 of RPC, it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting of the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with the commission of fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induced the offended party to part with his money.

            On the other hand, the following are the essential elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No 3019: a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and c) that his action caused any undue injury to any part, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

           Apparently, under the Mejorada doctrine, Section 3 of RA No 3019 enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to any public officer is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. The last sentence of Section 3 (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of public officers may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.

G.R. No. 190834

Ariel T. Lim v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 190834

Facts:

Lim issued two checks payable to cash to Baddie for the printing materials. Due to the delay in the delivery of the said materials, Lim issued a “Stop Payment” order for the two checks. However, the checks were drawn against insufficient funds. Lim was not able to arrange payments with Baddie within five banking days after receiving notice of the said error. Although, Lim was able to give the full payment for the materials after a lapse of more than one month.

Issue:

Whether or not Lim has committed estafa.

Held:

No. It must be noted that Lim has already paid in full the amount of the dishonored checks six months before the information was filed. In doing so, he was exonerated from the imposition of penalties for violation of BP bilang 22. It is a consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law.