GR No 139930

Republic of the Philippines vs Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al

GR No 139930        April 17, 2006

Facts:

Respondent Lobregat, together with the other respondents, was charged with the violation of Section 3 of RA No 3019 in the Office of the Ombudsman in her capacity as a member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB and UNICOM allegedly because these transactions allowed the other respondents unwarranted benefits and were grossly disadvantageous to the government.

During the pendency of this case, however, Lobregat died due to multi-organ failure. Counsel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the death of Lobregat extinguishes both her criminal as well as civil liability based solely on the act complained of.

OSG opposed the motion on the ground that said death does not extinguish her civil liability because the same is not solely based on the offense committed. It maintained, under Bayotas rule, that while respondent’s death extinguishes her criminal liability, the same cannot be made to apply with regard to her civil liability. As a director of UCPB and UNICOM, she had duties and liabilities under the law and in accordance with her employment contract.

The heirs of the respondent counter that the same could not be applied in the present case because herein respondent was a mere respondent in a complaint which the Office of the Ombudsman had dismissed. They explained that even assuming Bayotas rule applies, the death of respondent extinguished her civil liability, if any, since the same could only be based on delict.

Issue:

          WON the civil liability of accused be extinguished upon her death.

Held:

         Yes. Paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the RPC specifically provides that one of the grounds for the total extinguishment of criminal, as well as civil liability, if any, is the death of a party to the case.

In the present case, the death of respondent Lobregat, which occurred during the pendency of the case and before final judgment is rendered, extinguishes whatever criminal liability she might be held responsible for as the same is purely personal to her. Consequently, the civil liability arising from whatever criminal liability may be adjudged against her is perforce extinguished.

GR No 178000 and 178003

Liberato Carabeo vs Court of Appeals

GR No 178000 and 178003           December 4, 2009

Facts:

       Carabeo, then OIC of the Office of Treasurer of Paranaque City, was charged with committing acts in violation of RA No 3019. It was found that his net worth based on his SALNs from the time he commenced employment at the Paranaque Treasurer’s Office has ballooned extraordinarily. It was also noticeable that his net worth’s drastic increase was evidenced by the steady accumulation of various expensive properties ranging from real properties to vehicles to club shares ownership. However, Carabeo did not declare most of the vehicles owned in his SALNs as evidenced by the records in LTO.

            The Office of the Ombudsman Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-Acting Director Dacanay directed Secretary Teves to place Carabeo under preventive suspension without pay. Carabeo filed a petition for certiorari. CA then issued a 60-day TRO enjoining the enforcement of Carabeo’s preventive suspension. Meanwhile, Secretary Teves issued an order directing the detail of Carabeo in the BLGF-CO. The same was assailed by Carabeo to CA but it was denied.

            Hence, the petition before the SC.

Issue:

            WON Carabeo be held guilty of the crime charged against him.

Held:

            SC dismissed the petition. The validity of the executive order issued is immaterial to the validity of the charges against Carabeo. It was also held that the preventive suspension order was legal. Settles is the rule that prior notice and hearing are not required in the issuance of a preventive suspension order, such not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

        The Court also found that Carabeo has not disclosed assets in his SALN. As such, Carabeo’s non-disclosure of assets in his SALN constitutes a violation of RA No 3019, among others.

          As to the purpose of SALN, Section 8 of RA No 3019 speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing and minimizing, the opportunities for official corruption and maintain a standard f honesty in the public service. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.

          Significantly, Carabeo failed to show any requirement under RA No 3019 that prior notice of the non-completion of the SALN and its correction precede the filing of charges for violation of its provisions.

GR No 175750-51

Silverina Consigna vs People of the Philippines

GR No 175750-51    April 2, 2014

Facts:

            Consigna, then the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, obtained a loan from Moleta to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipality’s IRA had not yet arrived. As payment, Consigna issued three Land Bank of the Philippines checks signed by Rusillon, then incumbent mayor of the same municipality. In several attempts and on different occasions, Moleta demanded payment from Consigna and Rusillon, but to no avail. When she deposited the same to the bank, the checks were returned for having no sufficient funds. Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that said account indicated in the issued checks was already closed and transferred to DBP and Consigna had been relieved from her position.

            After trial, Sandiganbayan found Consigna guilty, but exonerated Rusillon for not having participated in the acts committed by Consigna. Hence, this petition with the SC.

Issue:

            WON Consigna be held guilty of estafa as penalized under Article 315 of RPC and that of Section 3 (e) of RA No 3019.

Held:

           The Petition must fail.

        SC ruled that it is entrenched in this jurisdiction is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information which specifies the provision of law to have been violated which were mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.

          In another matter, the law explicitly provides that in the prosecution for estafa under Article 315 of RPC, it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting of the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with the commission of fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induced the offended party to part with his money.

            On the other hand, the following are the essential elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No 3019: a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and c) that his action caused any undue injury to any part, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

           Apparently, under the Mejorada doctrine, Section 3 of RA No 3019 enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to any public officer is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. The last sentence of Section 3 (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of public officers may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.

GR No 186421

Roberto Fuentes vs People of the Philippines

GR No 186421         April 17, 2001

Facts:

         Fuentes was charged to have committed an act in violation of Article 3 (e) of RA No 3019, otherwise Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was alleged that Fuentes, a high ranking public official being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Pampanga, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to his office, caused undue injury to Fe Valenzuela by refusing to unreasonable length of time to renew the latter’s business permit to engage in Ship Chandling Services in the Port of Isabel without any legal basis. However, Fuentes contended that there were reports made that transaction in the said port involved illegal ones and thus the business permit of Valenzuela was not renewed in order to prevent a greater damage to the municipality as a result of such illegal transactions.

         Sandiganbayan found that Fuentes had established all the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 considering that: a) Fuentes was a public official at the time relevant to the case; b) he singled out Valenzuela’s particular business despite the fact that the rumors relative to the illegal smuggling and drug trading covered all ship chandlers operating in said port; c) he still refused to renew said business permit even though she already had clearances from other offices such as LGU and PNP, exculpating her from any illegal activities; and d) as a result of Fuente’s acts, Valenzuela was unable to operate her ship chandling business thus causing her undue injury.

       Fuentes then moved for reconsideration which Sandiganbayan denied. Hence, this petition before the SC.

Issue:

        WON Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime charged.

Held:

        The petition is without merit.

        The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No 3019 are as follows: a) accused must be a public official discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

      After a judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime charged.

         First element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of. As to the second element, law provides three modes of commission of the crime: a) manifest partiality; b) evident bad faith; and c) gross negligence. Here, Fuentes’ acts were not only committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith. Thirdly, Fuentes’ acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela’s favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred the said business from engaging in its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of Valenzuela.

GR No 169098

Manuel Baviera vs Rolando Zoleta

GR No 169098         October 12, 2006

Facts:

          Baviera filed several complaints against officers and directors of the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), Philippine Branch. Baviera was a former employee of the bank, and at the same time, an investor who was allegedly victimized by the officers and directors of the SCB. He filed for hold departure order against the accused and the same was granted. However, despite the same, Raman was still able to go out of the country to attend a conference when Secretary Datumanong lifted the HDO.

    Baviera received a copy of the Resoution approving the contention of Secretary Datumanong that the lifting of HDO was in order and no illegalities were committed as the same did not receive any compensation from Raman in exchange of the deed. Baviera filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

Issue:

        WON the respondent officials committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Held:

      The Court found that Baviera failed to establish that the respondent officials committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

         Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act to all in contemplation of the law.

          

        SC held that Baviera failed to establish probable cause for violation of Sections 3 (a), (e), and (j) of RA No 3019. Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court would not interfere with the exercise of the Ombudsman’s discretion who, based on his own findings and deliberate consideration of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it.