GR No 175750-51

Silverina Consigna vs People of the Philippines

GR No 175750-51    April 2, 2014

Facts:

            Consigna, then the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, obtained a loan from Moleta to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipality’s IRA had not yet arrived. As payment, Consigna issued three Land Bank of the Philippines checks signed by Rusillon, then incumbent mayor of the same municipality. In several attempts and on different occasions, Moleta demanded payment from Consigna and Rusillon, but to no avail. When she deposited the same to the bank, the checks were returned for having no sufficient funds. Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that said account indicated in the issued checks was already closed and transferred to DBP and Consigna had been relieved from her position.

            After trial, Sandiganbayan found Consigna guilty, but exonerated Rusillon for not having participated in the acts committed by Consigna. Hence, this petition with the SC.

Issue:

            WON Consigna be held guilty of estafa as penalized under Article 315 of RPC and that of Section 3 (e) of RA No 3019.

Held:

           The Petition must fail.

        SC ruled that it is entrenched in this jurisdiction is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information which specifies the provision of law to have been violated which were mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.

          In another matter, the law explicitly provides that in the prosecution for estafa under Article 315 of RPC, it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting of the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with the commission of fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induced the offended party to part with his money.

            On the other hand, the following are the essential elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No 3019: a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and c) that his action caused any undue injury to any part, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

           Apparently, under the Mejorada doctrine, Section 3 of RA No 3019 enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to any public officer is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. The last sentence of Section 3 (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of public officers may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.