AM No RTJ-96-1349

Spouses Jose ad Trinidad Bacar vs Judge De Guzman, Jr

AM No RTJ-96-1349         April 18, 1997

Facts:

          A Joint Judgment was rendered by Judge De Guzman, JR; one of those was a charge of homicide and another was a charge of attempted homicide, both against Gerardo Marcial. The accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Marcial was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as to the first case and imprisonment of 30 days of arresto mayor as regards the second case.

However, when Marcial submitted a motion for reconsideration to take into account at least two mitigating circumstances: 1) sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party which immediately preceded the act; and 2) that the accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. RTC granted the motion for reconsideration with a reduced penalty of 6 years of prision mayor as to the first case and retaining the sentence for the second case.

Spouses Bacar filed a motion for reconsideration and addendum to which Marcial opposed. The RTC Judge denied the said motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the Sps Bacar filed an administrative complaint against RTC Judge De Guzman, Jr for gross ignorance of law and for rendering unjust judgment.

Issue:

          WON RTC Judge was guilty of the charges against him.

Held:

     RTC Judge cannot be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment by considering in favor of the accused the two mitigating circumstances. Since it is a judicial matter, then the remedy of the complainants should likewise be judicial.

       

        However, RTC Judge is liable for gross ignorance of law for imposing a straight penalty of 6 years of imprisonment on the accused in the case for homicide. The application of ISLAW is mandatory where imprisonment would exceed 1 year. And in applying the same for offenses under RPC, the indeterminate sentence should have a fixed minimum and maximum.

          

       Although, there are exceptions as regards the application of ISLAW: a) offenses punished by death or life imprisonment; b) those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; c) those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, or espionage; d) those convicted of piracy; e) habitual delinquents; f) those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence; g) those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same; h) those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year; and i) those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the ISLAW.

    

     The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing and indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by RPC or by special laws, which definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.