GR No 170257

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

GR No 170257

FACTS:

          On Aug 15, 1996, RCBC received a letter of authority issues by the CIR Chato, authorizing a special audit team to examine the books of account and other accounting records of RCBC from Jan 1, 1994 to Dec 31, 1995. On Jan 1997, RCBC executed two Waivers of the Defense of Prescription under the Statute of Limitations covering the internal revenue taxes due for the years 1994 and 1995. It was provided under Section 203 of the Tax Code that the period of limitation upon assessment and collection is three (3) years except as provided in Section 222.

          On January 2007, RCBC received a Formal Letter of Demand together with Assessment Notices for the total deficiency tax of P4,170,058,634.49. RCBC disagreed with it and thus filed a protest of Feb 2004. On December 2006, after the reinvestigation, the amount was reduced to P303,160,496.55, which RCBC immediately paid.

        Further assessments for the deficiency onshore tax and documentary stamp tax remained unpaid as RCBC refused to do so as RCBC argued that the waivers of the Statute of Limitations in Jan 1997 were not valid as those were not signed or conformed to by the CIR as required under Section 222 (b) of the Tax Code.

          Consequently, RCBC filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

          WON the waivers of the defense of prescription were valid thus period of limitation of assessment and collection has prescribed.

HELD:

      YES, the waivers were valid and the period of limitation of assessment and collection has not prescribed.

      RCBC assails the validity of the waivers on the ground that those were merely attested to by Esquivas, then Coordinator for the CIR, and that he failed to indicate acceptance or agreement of the CIR as required under Section 223 (b) of the 1977 Tax Code. It further argued that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied against it because its payment of the other tax assessments does not signify a clear intention on its part to give up its right to question the validity of the waivers.

         The Court disagrees. Under Art 1431 of the Civil Code, the doctrine of estoppel is anchored on the rule that “an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disapproved as against the person relying thereon.” A party is precluded from denying his own acts, admissions or representations to the prejudice of the other party in order to prevent fraud and falsehood.

          Estoppel is clearly applicable to the case at bench. RCBC, through its partial payment of the revised assessments issued within the extended period as provided for in the questioned waivers, impliedly admitted the validity of those waivers. Had petitioner truly believed that the waivers were invalid and that the assessments were issued beyond the prescriptive period, then it should not have paid the reduced amount of taxes in the revised assessment. RCBC’s subsequent action effectively belies its insistence that the waivers are invalid. The records show that on December 6, 2000, upon receipt of the revised assessment, RCBC immediately made payment on the uncontested taxes.

         Thus, RCBC is estopped from questioning the validity of the waivers. To hold otherwise and allow a party to gainsay its own act or deny rights which it had previously recognized would run counter to the principle of equity which this institution holds dear.

GR No 67301

Manuel Bala vs Hon. Judge Martinez, People of the Philippines

GR No 67301         January 29, 1990

Facts:

          Bala has been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Diazen which had been attached to her USA passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. The RTC adjudged Bala guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. Bala appealed the said conviction but the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.

          Bala then applied for and was granted probation by Judge Martinez. He was placed in probation under a period of 1 year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. By its terms, it should have expired on August 10, 1983. However, on December 8, 1983, People of the Philippines through Assistant City Fiscal Cajucom filed a motion to revoke the probation as Bala had violated its terms and conditions. Bala now contends that the motion to revoke probation was filed after the lapse of 1 year, which means that he should have been discharged from the same.

Issue:

          WON the probation was revoked at the proper time.

Held:

          Yes, the SC held that probation is revocable before the final discharge by the court, contrary to Bala’s submission.

          Under the Probation Law, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not co-terminous with its period. There must first be issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.

        Bala failed to unite reunite with responsible society. Precisely, he was granted probation in order to give him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him hope, hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.

       A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the probationer because he is in the best position to report all information relative to the conduct and mental and physical condition of the probationer in his environment, and the existing institutional and community resources that he may avail himself of when necessary.

         

       The non-compliance the conditions set and fixed has defeated the very purposes of the probation law to: a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment; b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and c) prevent the commission of offenses.

GR No 123936

Ronald Soriano vs Court of Appeals

GR No 123936        March 4, 1999

Facts:

          Soriano was convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries, and damage to property. His application for probation was granted, and among the terms and conditions imposed by the trial court are that: 1) he shall meet his family responsibilities; 2) he shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change employment without prior notice to the supervising officer, or pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training; and 3) indemnify the heirs of the victim Daluyong.

          A month after, Assistant Prosecutor Fadera filed a motion to cancel the probation of Soriano due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and as he also committed another crime which was pending at the time. The Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a comment that recommended Soriano to be allowed to continue with his probation and be required instead to submit a program of payment for his civil liability. However, Soriano questioned the constitutionality of the condition for probation.

Issue:

          WON the revocation Soriano’s probation is lawful and proper.

Held:

          The Court held that the same was lawful and proper. Soriano’s refusal to comply with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He had notice of the orders, but up to the time being, he refused to comply with the same.

          Contrary to Soriano’s contention, the requirement is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The payment of the civil liability was not made a condition precedent to probation. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a requirement before he could avail of probation but was a condition for his continued enjoyment of the same.

          The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a condition for probation. This is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by law. It is a consequence of Soriano’s having been convicted of a crime, and he is bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or not he is in probation.

        The conditions set forth were not whims of the trial court but are requirement laid down by the statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose and the probationer is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and providing opportunity for the reformation of the penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence. Failure to comply will result in the revocation of the order granting probation, pursuant to Probation Law.

GR No 59298

Florentina Baclayon vs Hon Pacito Mutia

GR No 59298         April 30, 1984

Facts:

          Baclayon was a school teacher who was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation by the then MTC Judge Pacito Mutia, for having quarreled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words against Remedios Estillore who was the principal of the Plaridel Central School. The said conviction was affirmed by the CA taking into account the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her rank and age.

          As the sentence was promulgated on Spetember 9, 1981, Baclayon applied for probation within the same day with the respondent judge, who referred it to a Probation Officer. The Post-Sentence Investigation Report favorably recommended the granting of said application for probation. The respondent judge issued an order granting the same but modified the recommendation of Probation Officer by increasing probation period from 3 years to five years. The same also imposed the mandatory and discretionary conditions. However, among the conditions was one prohibiting Baclayon from continuing her teaching profession. Thus, Baclayon entered a plea for the deletion of such condition.

Issue:

          WON the discretionary probation provision by Judge Mutia is valid.

Held:

          No, the MTC Judge erred in including the provision in question.

       The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be general or mandatory and special or discretionary. Mandatory conditions are provided for in Section 10 of the Probation Law. Special conditions are those additional conditions listed in the same section with which the courts may additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison.

          

       However, the enumerations contained therein are not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the constitutional rights of the probationer are not jeopardized.

It should, however, be borne in mind that the special or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive, and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual.

       

        Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should be judged on its own merits—on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by the trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.

GR No 211214

Larry Manibog vs People of the Philippines

GR No 211214        March 20, 2019

Facts:

          

        Upon receipt of an information from a police asset that Manibog was standing outside the Municipal Tourism Office with a gun tucked in his waistband, Chief Inspector Beniat and his team proceeded to the area around 20 meters from the police station. Upon verification that such information was credible, the team slowly approached Manibog for fear that he might fight back. Upon closer look, Chief Inspector Beniat saw a bulge on Manibog’s waist which the police officer deduced to be a gun due to its distinct contour.

          

      As they have confirmed that Manibog had a gun tucked in his waistband, Chief Inspector disarmed and arrested him for violating the election gun ban and brought him to the police station for inquest proceeding. Manibog did not deny that he was carrying a gun but then he also alleged that Chief Inspector Beniat had other motives for such arrest.

          

      The RTC found Manibog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the election offense with which he was charged. It also ruled that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest because there was probable cause for the police to frisk and arrest him. The CA upheld the finding of RTC. Manibog moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA.

Issue:

          WON the warrantless search made upon Manibog was lawful, and if he was qualified to apply for probation.

Held:

          Yes, the warrantless search was lawful. No, he cannot apply for probation.

       Under the Constitution, search and seizure must be carried out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, the same would violate the Constitution. Any evidence resulting from it shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. But this is only the general rule. Exceptions to this were covered by jurisprudence.

         

         Since the warrantless search and seizure, as well as warrantless arrest, were found to be lawful, it is only just to hold Manibog guilty of the offense charged against him. He violated Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code which provided for the sentence of his punishment and the prohibition to apply for probation.

GR No 151258

Villareal vs People of the Philippines

GR No 151258        December 1, 2014

Facts:

      SC is asked to revisit the Decision held in the case involving the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa due to fraternity hazing. Some remaining matter were sought to be clarified and resolved. The matter include the effect of the Decision on the finality of the CA judgments insofar as respondents Tecson, et al are concerned.

        As decided, Dizon had a lowered criminal liability from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al from slight physical injuries. Apparently, Tecson et al applied for probation. The terms and conditions of their probation were allegedly completed. However, the said probation was applied for with the wrong court.

Issue:

     WON the completion by Tecson et al of the terms and conditions of their probation discharge them from their criminal liability?

Held:

         Tecson et al filed their Application for Probation with the wrong court. Part of the criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case before it.

         Under the Probation Law, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application of the said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No probation shall be granted nor entertained when defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.

          Applicants of probation are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement provided that the same should be done with the court which rendered the judgment of conviction. The said provision is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering therefore that the probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, the same is void.

      Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self-respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration in the community.

In any event, Tecson et al were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA.

GR No 92020

People of the Philippines vs Eliseo Martinado, Hermogenes Martinado, John Doe, alias “Rolly”

GR No 92020         October 19, 1992

Facts:

          Eliseo and Hermogenes were accused of the crime of robbery with homicide and was found by the RTC to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As there was no appreciable mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, both are sentenced to suffer imprisonment under the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hermogenes was credited in the service of his sentence with the full time that he has undergone one preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the RPC provided conditions prescribed thereon have been complied with.

The promulgation of this decision was made in the absence of Eliseo as he had earlier escaped after the defense has rested its case. He was later re-arrested only almost a year after he escaped and 2 months after the said promulgation. It was then that the counsel of record for Hemogenes and Eliseo filed a notice of appeal for both accused.

Issue:

          WON an escapee may avail of ISLAW

Held:

          No, an escapee may not avail of ISLAW.

      

      Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, if the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within 15 days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel.

Also, according to a recent case, an accused who had escaped from confinement during the trial on the merits and who remains at large at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses his right to appeal therefrom, unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of judgment. The reason therefor is that an accused who escapes from detention, humps bail or flees to a foreign country loses his standing in court, unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom. The same cannot be given a retroactive effect.

In this case, both Hemogenes and Eliseo were found guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the RPC. As there was an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and in the absence of mitigating circumstance to offset, and applying the provisions of ISLAW, Hemogenes’ sentence was modified to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum. Eliseo, on the other hand, was not entitled to the benefits of ISLAW as he had escaped from confinement. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer penalty of imprisonment of 17 years 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal maximum.

AM No RTJ-96-1349

Spouses Jose ad Trinidad Bacar vs Judge De Guzman, Jr

AM No RTJ-96-1349         April 18, 1997

Facts:

          A Joint Judgment was rendered by Judge De Guzman, JR; one of those was a charge of homicide and another was a charge of attempted homicide, both against Gerardo Marcial. The accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Marcial was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as to the first case and imprisonment of 30 days of arresto mayor as regards the second case.

However, when Marcial submitted a motion for reconsideration to take into account at least two mitigating circumstances: 1) sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party which immediately preceded the act; and 2) that the accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. RTC granted the motion for reconsideration with a reduced penalty of 6 years of prision mayor as to the first case and retaining the sentence for the second case.

Spouses Bacar filed a motion for reconsideration and addendum to which Marcial opposed. The RTC Judge denied the said motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the Sps Bacar filed an administrative complaint against RTC Judge De Guzman, Jr for gross ignorance of law and for rendering unjust judgment.

Issue:

          WON RTC Judge was guilty of the charges against him.

Held:

     RTC Judge cannot be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment by considering in favor of the accused the two mitigating circumstances. Since it is a judicial matter, then the remedy of the complainants should likewise be judicial.

       

        However, RTC Judge is liable for gross ignorance of law for imposing a straight penalty of 6 years of imprisonment on the accused in the case for homicide. The application of ISLAW is mandatory where imprisonment would exceed 1 year. And in applying the same for offenses under RPC, the indeterminate sentence should have a fixed minimum and maximum.

          

       Although, there are exceptions as regards the application of ISLAW: a) offenses punished by death or life imprisonment; b) those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; c) those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, or espionage; d) those convicted of piracy; e) habitual delinquents; f) those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence; g) those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same; h) those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year; and i) those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the ISLAW.

    

     The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing and indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by RPC or by special laws, which definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.

GR No 225442

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs Quezon City, City of Manila and Navotas City

GR No 225442        August 8, 2017

Facts:

          Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as “Oplan Rody”.

          SPARK, an association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, and other petitioners filed this petition arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they” a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; c) deprive the minors of the right to liberty and right to travel without substantive due process; and d) deprive the parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.

          Further, they claim that the Manila Ordinance contravenes with Section 57-A20 of RA 9344 as the imposition of penalties contravenes the command of the said special law that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations. This case has been presented directly to Supreme Court via petition for certiorari for decision.

Issue:

          WON the curfew ordinances are valid and constitutional.

Held:

          It was held by the SC that only the Quezon City Curfew Ordinance has passed the two prongs or tests of the validity of an ordinance.

          According to SC, SPARK and other petitioners in this case are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances.

          Under Section 7 of RA No 9344, the age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.

          This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630, which amended RA 9344, repeals all ordinances inconsistent with the statutory law. Thus, minors caught in violation of curfew ordinance are children at risk, and therefore covered by its provisions. It is a long-standing principle that conformity with the law is one of the essential elements for the validity of ordinance.

GR No 176102

Rosal Hubilla vs People of the Philippines

GR No 176102        November 26, 2014

Facts:

         Hubilla was charged of homicide for stabbing Jayson Espinola with a knife, inflicting upon him mortal wounds in his body directly causing his death. The RTC rendered a judgment finding Hubilla guilty of homicide and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for 4 years and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.

         On appeal, the CA affirmed the said conviction but modified the penalty. The sentence was reduced to 6 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor as maximum. But CA amended its judgment on motion for reconsideration, modifying sentence to an indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor.

Issue:

       WON Hubilla was entitled to suspension of sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate of RA No 9344

Held:

       SC held that Article 249 of the RPC prescribes a penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering that Hubilla was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years of age when he committed the homicide, such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.

       Hubilla’s insistence to further reduce the sentence imposed is bereft of legal basis. In fact, neither the RPC, nor RA No 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.

        Although Section 38 of RA No 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of the child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age. However, if said child reached 18 years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, to order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years.

      We note that Hubilla was well over the age of 23 years at the time of his conviction for homicide. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible. Lastly, the imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited.

GR No 182239

People of the Philippines vs Hermie Jacinto

GR No 182239        March 16, 2011

Facts:

Jacinto was charged of the crime of rape for having a carnal knowledge of AAA, who was five years old at the time, thus, with a qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority. Jacinto entered a plea of not guilty by having defenses of denial and alibi. However, the RTC held Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentences him to death. Thereafter, the trial was reopened as there was a newly-discovered evidence showing that Jacinto was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. RTC then amended the sentence to reclusion perpetual.

When appealed to CA, the RTC decision was affirmed but with modifications as to the sentence. Jacinto was adjudged to suffer the Indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Issue:

          WON Jacinto may benefit from RA 9344 as he already exceeded the age of 21 upon conviction.

Held:

          The SC sustains the CA judgment of conviction. CA considered RA No 9344 despite the commission of the crime 3 years before the law was enacted on April 28, 2006. It is only right for the court to recognize its retroactive application.

          Section 6 of RA No 9344 exempts a child above 15 years but below 18 years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, “the appropriate proceedings” in accordance with the Act shall be observed. In the present case, indications that Jacinto acted with discernment are present. Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.

          The birth certificate of AAA showed her date of birth which makes her only 5 years old when Jacinto defiled her, and the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below 7 years old applies. Although, the following calls for the reduction of the penalty: 1) prohibition against death penalty under RA No 9344, and 2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of Jacinto which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Art 68 of the RPC. It relied on a case wherein death was excluded from the graduation of penalties in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of minority.

         However, SC held that under Article 68 of RPC, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for Jacinto is reclusion perpetua.

GR No 180380

Raymund Madali and Rodel Madali vs People of the Philippines

GR No 180380        August 4, 2009

Facts:

          Raymund and Rodel were accused of the crime of Murder after allegedly willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacking, assaulting, and striking AAA with a coconut frond and ‘llave inglesia’ and strangling with a dog chain, leading to an untimely death.

          Both plead not guilty by denial and alibi. The RTC, however, rendered a guilty verdict against them and convicted them only of homicide as there was a failure to prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. They were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 4 years, 2 months, and I day to six years of imprisonment. They elevated their conviction to the CA.

          CA affirmed the findings of RTC that both of the accused killed AAA. However, pursuant to Section 64 of RA No 9344, Raymond’s case was dismissed as the law provides exemption from criminal liability a minor 15 years of below at the time of the commission of the crime. Rodel’s conviction was sustained with six months and one day6 months and 1 day of prision coreccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, but the imposition was suspended pursuant to RA No 9344. Both assailed the decision.

Issue:

          WON the accused may avail of the benefit provided by RA 9344.

Held:

          Yes, Raymond may avail of the benefit provided by RA 9344 while Rodel may not as he acted with discernment in the act of crime.

          As to Raymond’s criminal liability, he is exempt. He was only 14 years old at the time he committed the crime. He would be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian. Under RA 9344, a child 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability, but he will be subject to an intervention program.

          As to Rodel, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is necessary pursuant to RA 9344. It provides that a child above 15 years of age but below 18 years of age shall be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. As the CA correctly opined, Rodel acted with discernment as was aware that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy.

          However, as he was only 16 years old, Article 68 of the RPC provided that the penalty imposed upon him should be the penalty next lower than that prescribed. Thus, 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor is in order.

GR No 151085

Joemar Ortega vs People of the Philippines

GR No 151085        August 20, 2008

Facts:

          Ortega was about 14 years of age when he was charged with a crime of rape in two separate Information for allegedly raping AAA, who was then about 8 years of age. Apparently, there were two conflicting stories as to what happened during the time which AAA alleged to have been raped by Ortega.

         The RTC held that the defenses of denial by Ortega cannot prevail over the positive identification by AAA and BBB who testified with honesty and credibility as to the person of Ortega. The imposed penalty was imprisonment for a period of 6 six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Ortega appealed.

        CA affirmed the ruling of RTC holding that the positive identification of Ortega by AAA and BBB were categorical, consistent, and without showing any ill motive. It also ruled that the respective medical examinations were irrelevant as it is established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape. Again, Ortega assailed the decision.

Issue:

          WON Ortega may avail of the benefit given by law under RA No 9344.

Held:

          Yes, Ortega may avail of the same.

          SC was convinced that Ortega committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis.

          However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute freewill or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.

       What is controlling, though, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the child in conflict with the law, is not his age at the time of the promulgation of the judgment but his age at the time of the commission of the offense.

       It bears stressing that Ortega was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner’s own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother.

          

            Hence, Ortega may avail of the benefit given by the law under RA No 9344.