GR No 170257

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

GR No 170257

FACTS:

          On Aug 15, 1996, RCBC received a letter of authority issues by the CIR Chato, authorizing a special audit team to examine the books of account and other accounting records of RCBC from Jan 1, 1994 to Dec 31, 1995. On Jan 1997, RCBC executed two Waivers of the Defense of Prescription under the Statute of Limitations covering the internal revenue taxes due for the years 1994 and 1995. It was provided under Section 203 of the Tax Code that the period of limitation upon assessment and collection is three (3) years except as provided in Section 222.

          On January 2007, RCBC received a Formal Letter of Demand together with Assessment Notices for the total deficiency tax of P4,170,058,634.49. RCBC disagreed with it and thus filed a protest of Feb 2004. On December 2006, after the reinvestigation, the amount was reduced to P303,160,496.55, which RCBC immediately paid.

        Further assessments for the deficiency onshore tax and documentary stamp tax remained unpaid as RCBC refused to do so as RCBC argued that the waivers of the Statute of Limitations in Jan 1997 were not valid as those were not signed or conformed to by the CIR as required under Section 222 (b) of the Tax Code.

          Consequently, RCBC filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

          WON the waivers of the defense of prescription were valid thus period of limitation of assessment and collection has prescribed.

HELD:

      YES, the waivers were valid and the period of limitation of assessment and collection has not prescribed.

      RCBC assails the validity of the waivers on the ground that those were merely attested to by Esquivas, then Coordinator for the CIR, and that he failed to indicate acceptance or agreement of the CIR as required under Section 223 (b) of the 1977 Tax Code. It further argued that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied against it because its payment of the other tax assessments does not signify a clear intention on its part to give up its right to question the validity of the waivers.

         The Court disagrees. Under Art 1431 of the Civil Code, the doctrine of estoppel is anchored on the rule that “an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disapproved as against the person relying thereon.” A party is precluded from denying his own acts, admissions or representations to the prejudice of the other party in order to prevent fraud and falsehood.

          Estoppel is clearly applicable to the case at bench. RCBC, through its partial payment of the revised assessments issued within the extended period as provided for in the questioned waivers, impliedly admitted the validity of those waivers. Had petitioner truly believed that the waivers were invalid and that the assessments were issued beyond the prescriptive period, then it should not have paid the reduced amount of taxes in the revised assessment. RCBC’s subsequent action effectively belies its insistence that the waivers are invalid. The records show that on December 6, 2000, upon receipt of the revised assessment, RCBC immediately made payment on the uncontested taxes.

         Thus, RCBC is estopped from questioning the validity of the waivers. To hold otherwise and allow a party to gainsay its own act or deny rights which it had previously recognized would run counter to the principle of equity which this institution holds dear.

GR No 67301

Manuel Bala vs Hon. Judge Martinez, People of the Philippines

GR No 67301         January 29, 1990

Facts:

          Bala has been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Diazen which had been attached to her USA passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. The RTC adjudged Bala guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. Bala appealed the said conviction but the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.

          Bala then applied for and was granted probation by Judge Martinez. He was placed in probation under a period of 1 year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. By its terms, it should have expired on August 10, 1983. However, on December 8, 1983, People of the Philippines through Assistant City Fiscal Cajucom filed a motion to revoke the probation as Bala had violated its terms and conditions. Bala now contends that the motion to revoke probation was filed after the lapse of 1 year, which means that he should have been discharged from the same.

Issue:

          WON the probation was revoked at the proper time.

Held:

          Yes, the SC held that probation is revocable before the final discharge by the court, contrary to Bala’s submission.

          Under the Probation Law, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not co-terminous with its period. There must first be issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.

        Bala failed to unite reunite with responsible society. Precisely, he was granted probation in order to give him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him hope, hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.

       A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the probationer because he is in the best position to report all information relative to the conduct and mental and physical condition of the probationer in his environment, and the existing institutional and community resources that he may avail himself of when necessary.

         

       The non-compliance the conditions set and fixed has defeated the very purposes of the probation law to: a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment; b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and c) prevent the commission of offenses.

GR No 123936

Ronald Soriano vs Court of Appeals

GR No 123936        March 4, 1999

Facts:

          Soriano was convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries, and damage to property. His application for probation was granted, and among the terms and conditions imposed by the trial court are that: 1) he shall meet his family responsibilities; 2) he shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change employment without prior notice to the supervising officer, or pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training; and 3) indemnify the heirs of the victim Daluyong.

          A month after, Assistant Prosecutor Fadera filed a motion to cancel the probation of Soriano due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and as he also committed another crime which was pending at the time. The Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a comment that recommended Soriano to be allowed to continue with his probation and be required instead to submit a program of payment for his civil liability. However, Soriano questioned the constitutionality of the condition for probation.

Issue:

          WON the revocation Soriano’s probation is lawful and proper.

Held:

          The Court held that the same was lawful and proper. Soriano’s refusal to comply with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He had notice of the orders, but up to the time being, he refused to comply with the same.

          Contrary to Soriano’s contention, the requirement is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The payment of the civil liability was not made a condition precedent to probation. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a requirement before he could avail of probation but was a condition for his continued enjoyment of the same.

          The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a condition for probation. This is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by law. It is a consequence of Soriano’s having been convicted of a crime, and he is bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or not he is in probation.

        The conditions set forth were not whims of the trial court but are requirement laid down by the statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose and the probationer is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and providing opportunity for the reformation of the penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence. Failure to comply will result in the revocation of the order granting probation, pursuant to Probation Law.

GR No 59298

Florentina Baclayon vs Hon Pacito Mutia

GR No 59298         April 30, 1984

Facts:

          Baclayon was a school teacher who was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation by the then MTC Judge Pacito Mutia, for having quarreled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words against Remedios Estillore who was the principal of the Plaridel Central School. The said conviction was affirmed by the CA taking into account the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her rank and age.

          As the sentence was promulgated on Spetember 9, 1981, Baclayon applied for probation within the same day with the respondent judge, who referred it to a Probation Officer. The Post-Sentence Investigation Report favorably recommended the granting of said application for probation. The respondent judge issued an order granting the same but modified the recommendation of Probation Officer by increasing probation period from 3 years to five years. The same also imposed the mandatory and discretionary conditions. However, among the conditions was one prohibiting Baclayon from continuing her teaching profession. Thus, Baclayon entered a plea for the deletion of such condition.

Issue:

          WON the discretionary probation provision by Judge Mutia is valid.

Held:

          No, the MTC Judge erred in including the provision in question.

       The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be general or mandatory and special or discretionary. Mandatory conditions are provided for in Section 10 of the Probation Law. Special conditions are those additional conditions listed in the same section with which the courts may additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison.

          

       However, the enumerations contained therein are not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the constitutional rights of the probationer are not jeopardized.

It should, however, be borne in mind that the special or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive, and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual.

       

        Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should be judged on its own merits—on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by the trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.

GR No 211214

Larry Manibog vs People of the Philippines

GR No 211214        March 20, 2019

Facts:

          

        Upon receipt of an information from a police asset that Manibog was standing outside the Municipal Tourism Office with a gun tucked in his waistband, Chief Inspector Beniat and his team proceeded to the area around 20 meters from the police station. Upon verification that such information was credible, the team slowly approached Manibog for fear that he might fight back. Upon closer look, Chief Inspector Beniat saw a bulge on Manibog’s waist which the police officer deduced to be a gun due to its distinct contour.

          

      As they have confirmed that Manibog had a gun tucked in his waistband, Chief Inspector disarmed and arrested him for violating the election gun ban and brought him to the police station for inquest proceeding. Manibog did not deny that he was carrying a gun but then he also alleged that Chief Inspector Beniat had other motives for such arrest.

          

      The RTC found Manibog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the election offense with which he was charged. It also ruled that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest because there was probable cause for the police to frisk and arrest him. The CA upheld the finding of RTC. Manibog moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA.

Issue:

          WON the warrantless search made upon Manibog was lawful, and if he was qualified to apply for probation.

Held:

          Yes, the warrantless search was lawful. No, he cannot apply for probation.

       Under the Constitution, search and seizure must be carried out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, the same would violate the Constitution. Any evidence resulting from it shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. But this is only the general rule. Exceptions to this were covered by jurisprudence.

         

         Since the warrantless search and seizure, as well as warrantless arrest, were found to be lawful, it is only just to hold Manibog guilty of the offense charged against him. He violated Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code which provided for the sentence of his punishment and the prohibition to apply for probation.

GR No 151258

Villareal vs People of the Philippines

GR No 151258        December 1, 2014

Facts:

      SC is asked to revisit the Decision held in the case involving the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa due to fraternity hazing. Some remaining matter were sought to be clarified and resolved. The matter include the effect of the Decision on the finality of the CA judgments insofar as respondents Tecson, et al are concerned.

        As decided, Dizon had a lowered criminal liability from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al from slight physical injuries. Apparently, Tecson et al applied for probation. The terms and conditions of their probation were allegedly completed. However, the said probation was applied for with the wrong court.

Issue:

     WON the completion by Tecson et al of the terms and conditions of their probation discharge them from their criminal liability?

Held:

         Tecson et al filed their Application for Probation with the wrong court. Part of the criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case before it.

         Under the Probation Law, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application of the said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No probation shall be granted nor entertained when defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.

          Applicants of probation are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement provided that the same should be done with the court which rendered the judgment of conviction. The said provision is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering therefore that the probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, the same is void.

      Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self-respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration in the community.

In any event, Tecson et al were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA.

GR No 92020

People of the Philippines vs Eliseo Martinado, Hermogenes Martinado, John Doe, alias “Rolly”

GR No 92020         October 19, 1992

Facts:

          Eliseo and Hermogenes were accused of the crime of robbery with homicide and was found by the RTC to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As there was no appreciable mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, both are sentenced to suffer imprisonment under the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hermogenes was credited in the service of his sentence with the full time that he has undergone one preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the RPC provided conditions prescribed thereon have been complied with.

The promulgation of this decision was made in the absence of Eliseo as he had earlier escaped after the defense has rested its case. He was later re-arrested only almost a year after he escaped and 2 months after the said promulgation. It was then that the counsel of record for Hemogenes and Eliseo filed a notice of appeal for both accused.

Issue:

          WON an escapee may avail of ISLAW

Held:

          No, an escapee may not avail of ISLAW.

      

      Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, if the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within 15 days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel.

Also, according to a recent case, an accused who had escaped from confinement during the trial on the merits and who remains at large at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses his right to appeal therefrom, unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of judgment. The reason therefor is that an accused who escapes from detention, humps bail or flees to a foreign country loses his standing in court, unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom. The same cannot be given a retroactive effect.

In this case, both Hemogenes and Eliseo were found guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the RPC. As there was an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and in the absence of mitigating circumstance to offset, and applying the provisions of ISLAW, Hemogenes’ sentence was modified to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum. Eliseo, on the other hand, was not entitled to the benefits of ISLAW as he had escaped from confinement. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer penalty of imprisonment of 17 years 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal maximum.